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Abstract: 
 
This study investigates the nature and extent to which managerial 
attitudes influence fraud risk perceptions, observations and experiences 
of audit partners.  Using a sample of 5,603 client acceptance and audit 
continuance assessments at a Big Four audit firm in the Netherlands, this 
study finds that: (1) manager integrity, honesty, and ethics are 
considered by audit partners to be of highest importance in fraud risk 
assessments; (2) the aggressiveness of an organization’s revenue 
recognition and accounting estimates appear to significantly influence 
auditor fraud risk perceptions; and (3) the quality of the audit-client 
relationship, and the level of senior management experience, provide 
important cues influencing auditor perceptions in “low risk” fraud 
situations, but neither are used to identify nor categorize high fraud risk 
clients.  These empirical findings highlight the significant importance of 
senior management attitudes in influencing auditor perspectives, 
accounting for 82% of the variability in fraud risk assessments.   
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates how indications of mistrust and managerial 
attitudes in an organization’s financial reporting culture may be associated 
with heightened auditor fraud risk assessments.1  Prior research has found that 
managerial attitudes and aggressiveness towards financial reporting are 
important fraud red flags (Loebbecke et al. 1989; Bell and Carcello 2000).  
There is evidence that the ethical tone in an organization is largely derived 
from senior management attitudes (Cohen 2002) and that intentions to engage 
in fraudulent activity are to linked to moral reasoning levels (Uddin and Gillett 
2002).  Empirical research suggests that fraud red flags associated with 
management attitudes and behaviours carry more weight than motivation and 
condition red flags (Deshmukh and Talluru 1998); however, such behaviours 
and attitudes are difficult to observe and empirically study.  This study 
attempts to address this gap in the literature, by examining senior management 
attitudes from the perspective and experiences of external auditors.2 
 
One of the responsibilities of an auditor is to correctly assess the risk of 
financial fraud at their clients (Zimbelman and Waller 1999; SAS 99; ISA 
240).3  Auditor risk assessments have often been used to study earnings 
manipulation behaviour and auditor decisions (Bedard and Johnstone 2004; 
Johnstone 2000) and are used within this study as a basis to study the 
                                                 
1 This study is focused on financial reporting fraud and does not consider the broader 
definition of fraud which covers embezzlement, corruption, and other channels of 
opportunism, or illegal behaviour.  Therefore, the findings from the study of financial 
reporting fraud need to be constrained to this one type of illegal activity. 
2 This study uses a sample of auditor risk assessments which were performed in the client 
acceptance and continuance procedures of a Big Four Dutch firm within a two year period. 
3 Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) used a game theory perspective of fraud settings in order to 
develop suggestions for audit policy and practice action steps intended to improve fraud 
detection and deterrence.  Their overall summary on fraud risk assessments noted that fraud 
checklist usage may be unreliable; auditors generally overweight cues indicative of 
management’s character, lowering their fraud risk assessment to a too-low level, even though 
the opportunity and incentives may be high (Jonas 2001; SAS 99) and these clues may be 
most unreliable; and audit standards should consider how management may manipulate their 
perception of fraud cues. 
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 importance of management attitudes and trust across fraud risk assessments.4  
This study extends the work of Bell and Carcello (2000) and Loebbecke et al. 
(1989), and considers managerial ethics, alongside common accounting fraud 
schemes (management choices) involving revenue recognition and accounting 
estimates (extending the work of Hernandez and Groot 2006a,b).  More 
specifically, three principal research questions will be investigated.  First, as a 
general question, are indications of mistrust perceived by auditors as important 
considerations within their fraud risk assessments?  Second, are ethical 
boundaries perceived more important than accounting rule boundaries in 
relation to fraud?  Lastly, is there any guidance or recommendations for the 
development and improvement of financial reporting cultures, which build 
trust and potentially reduce instances of fraud? 
 
Practitioner guidelines, as codified in audit standards (SAS 99; ISA 
240), have outlined auditor responsibilities in relation to fraud and three 
conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
(a) incentive and pressures on managers; (b) an opportunity to engage in fraud; 
and (c) managers, and the organization, have an attitude or method of 
rationalization which justifies their behaviour.5  In applying such standards, 
auditors are called to pay special attention to illegal acts (ISA 250; SAS 54)6 
and the materiality or significance of senior management improper conduct in 
                                                 
4 Indications of mistrust, capturing dimensions of an organization’s financial reporting culture, 
are defined within this study to cover the ethical conduct of senior management, their honesty, 
and the aggressiveness of management’s accounting practices. 
5 ISA 240 and SAS 99 provide lists of fraud indications, but do not specifically define what an 
appropriate audit response should look like nor does it address the relative importance of fraud 
cues. 
6 ISA 250, Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements, which 
is similar to SAS 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, states that the auditor should “obtain an 
understanding of the nature of the act and the circumstances in which it has occurred, and 
sufficient other information to evaluate the possible effect on the financial statements.”  In 
addition, ISA 250 states that “the auditor should consider the implications of non-compliance 
[with laws and regulations] in relation to other aspects of the audit, particularly the reliability 
of management representations.”  Practitioner auditor guidance, therefore, highlights the 
importance of senior management integrity, ethics, honesty, and the aggressiveness of an 
organization’s accounting practices as important elements associated with fraud. 
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 relation to the financial statements and management’s representations thereof 
(SAB 99; ISA 320; SAS 54; ISA 250).7     
 
The contribution of this study to the existing literature is fourfold. 
Unlike the models tested by Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Bell and Carcello 
(2000), which are based on the presence or absence of risk factors, the model 
in this study contains Likert-type, risk-framed scales permitting more 
variability in the measurement of fraud risk factors. This study’s data does not 
originate from surveys (Loebbecke et al. 1989; Bell and Carcello 2000; Nelson 
et al. 2002) or from experiments (as is the case, for instance, in Eining et al. 
1997; Gillet and Uddin 2005; Dusenbury et al. 2000), but it is archival data 
from 5,603 client acceptance and audit continuation decisions made between 
2002 and 2004. The type of data and the size of the sample allow the use of 
structural equation modelling techniques, which enables the analysis of the 
relative strength of each of the independent variables, as well as their 
interrelatedness in identifying fraudulent reporting. And, perhaps more 
important, this study extends the current literature by using non-US data, 
which may help bridge US research into a European context. The non-United 
States context is important as most empirical studies of fraud have been 
restricted to United States’ SEC sanctioned firms. This sample of SEC-
sanctioned firms covers over 100 companies and has been extensively 
investigated, but virtually nothing is known about the characteristics of fraud 
outside the United States, its impact on the capital markets, and whether non-
US populations would respond differently to ethical financial reporting 
matters (Merchant and Rockness 1994). This study investigates the effect of 
two of the most-often cited fraud scheme areas in the US (revenue recognition 
                                                 
7 The degree of non-compliance with laws or ethical codes and the extent of an accounting 
violation, all refer to a set of rules which require judgement for interpretation.  Generally, 
materiality or significance guidelines are used to determine the severity of a violation.  ISA 
240 distinguishes errors as unintentional misstatements and labels intentional misstatements as 
fraud.   This approach is similar to the one adopted by SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 
Materiality.  The focus on “softer” elements such as intent, aggressiveness, and bias are strong 
indications why a strong focus on the financial reporting culture warrants the research 
documented in this paper.  The next generation of auditing procedures are not those that focus 
on complex transactions and control assertions, but those that set and test for boundaries for a 
sound financial reporting culture within an organization. 
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 and accounting estimates; SEC 2003) and those most often involved in 
misconduct (senior executives; SEC 2003) within a European context. 8 
 
This study documents that managerial attitudes significantly affect 
auditor fraud risk decisions, accounting for 82% of the variability in audit 
partner judgements (supporting Deshmukh and Talluru 1998).  Auditor 
concerns over senior management ethics and integrity are found to be of 
highest importance and significance in their assessments of fraud risks, 
followed by concerns over aggressive revenue recognition and accounting 
estimates (consistent with Kizirian et al. 2005).9  At lower fraud propensity 
levels, indications of mistrust appear to be more driven by accounting practice 
considerations rather than ethics.  This would indicate that accounting 
convention concerns are more prevalent and initial indications of increased 
fraud risk.  However, across the full sample and after isolating all higher fraud 
risk assessments, senior management ethical and integrity concerns are found 
to be more important indications of managerial attitudes, affecting auditor 
fraud risk observations and shaped by experiences.  Therefore, ethical 
principles may be perceived by auditors as more important boundaries 
defining the financial reporting culture in an organization, and affecting the 
likelihood of fraud, more than accounting rules.  This could indicate that 
individual characteristics such as moral reasoning level and organizational 
conditions (ethical climate) need to be more closely considered by directors 
                                                 
8 Further, research into illegal acts has noted that executives who ignore, condone, reward, or 
participate in past instances of wrongdoing will likely be recidivists (Baucus 1994).  
Therefore, the financial reporting culture within an organization, shaped by the ethical tone of 
senior managers, their degree of honesty, and aggressiveness of accounting practices, is likely 
to be associated with fraud 
9 The audit literature dealing with fraud has found that senior executives are generally 
responsible for accounting fraud violations (SEC 2003) and that in the majority of cases where 
auditors recalled management fraud, there were indications of decision-making domination by 
one person or a small group acting in concert, ethical misconduct, and weak internal controls 
(Loebbecke et al. 1989; Bell and Carcello 2000).  Further, US regulators have noted that the 
vast majority of accounting violations involved either aggressive revenue recognition or 
improper recording of expenses or losses (SEC 2003; Bell and Carcello 2000).  Corporate 
cultures, influenced by the policies and practices of senior management, exert strong influence 
on employee behaviour and can therefore promote serious violations of law, and in such subtle 
and pervasive fashion that managers may come to lose sight of legal obligations completely 
(Baucus 1994). 
 4 
 and regulators in devising adequate policies and practices that mitigates this 
risk within organizations.  
 
The results also show that the honesty and openness reflected in the 
auditor-management relationship is a significant source of cues which auditors 
use in gauging an organization’s financial reporting culture and its propensity 
for fraud.  However, cues attributable to the quality of the auditor-
management relationship and the quality of senior management are not used 
by auditors (or perceived as important) in their assessment or categorization of 
higher fraud-risk clients.  Both factors appear to be important trust-related red 
flags, but auditors appear to need additional, more specific indications to 
classify potential clients in high risk categories. Perhaps, as a possible 
implication, the next generation of audit procedures are those that seek out 
indications of management misconduct (e.g., through whistleblower 
“hotlines”) rather than those exclusively focused on accounting errors and 
information systems.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section 
provides a literature review, based on which an empirical model is developed.  
The third section discusses the risk assessment sample and describes the 
research design.  The empirical results are given in the fourth section. 
Conclusions, recommendations, and implications for future research are found 
in the final section. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
Differing importance of fraud red flags 
 
There is a substantive amount of research covering the subject of 
fraud.10  However, there is limited research on how indications of increased 
fraud risk can be weighted or put into a model to assess the likelihood of 
fraud.  Hackenbrack (1993) noted that there was a high degree of variability in 
the importance ratings assigned to various fraud risk factors which appeared 
partially attributable to the auditors' experience and client size. They noted 
that auditors assigned primarily to large client engagements place relatively 
more emphasis on risk factors relating to opportunity to commit fraud than do 
auditors assigned primarily to smaller companies.    
 
Bell and Carcello (2000) proposed a model useful in predicting the 
existence of fraudulent financial reporting, which correctly classified 80 
percent of the fraud cases while only misclassifying 11 percent of the non-
fraud cases. The significant risk factors included in the model were: weak 
internal control environment, rapid growth, inadequate/inconsistent 
profitability, undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections, dishonest or 
overly evasive management, ownership status (private vs. public), and an 
                                                 
10 Academic literature, in the fields of psychology, accounting, auditing, law, and economics, 
provide various complementary theories, which explain why financial fraud arises in business.  
These disciplines provide alternative hypotheses to control mechanisms, that may help prevent 
such irregularities.  For example, social and cognitive psychology gives insight into human 
thinking, rationalization, and behaviour at the individual level and within a social context.  
Management accounting and control literature, particularly literature related to reliance on 
accounting performance measures (RAPM) and budgeting, gives insight into the behaviour of 
managers in an accounting performance measurement, control, and evaluation system.  
Financial reporting research has studied capital market responses to accounting earnings and, 
in the area of earnings management, provided a wealth of knowledge into manager 
motivations and conditions that lead to earnings manipulation behaviour.  The auditing 
literature has been studying auditor experiences and application of knowledge in the area of 
accounting fraud.  Legal, criminal, and corporate governance research provide insight into the 
constraints and behaviours which affect individual managers, executives, boards, and audit 
committees and the repercussions (from regulators and litigation) of the failure of these groups 
to exercise their legal and fiduciary duties.  Economics has contributed the principal-agency 
theory, the concept of utility as the basis for explaining  that lead to accounting fraud, and the 
concept of contracts as a means to control agent behaviour.   
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 interaction between a weak control environment and an aggressive attitude 
toward financial reporting.11   Apostolou et al. (2001) found that management 
characteristics and influence over the control environment red flags were 
approximately twice as important as operating and financial stability 
characteristics red flags and about four times as important as industry 
conditions using an analytic hierarchy process. 
 
Albrecht and Romney (1986) found that one-third of the 87 red flags 
studied were found to be significant predictors of fraud, which generally 
included personal characteristics of management.  Loebbecke et al. (1989) 
presented the results of a survey of audit partners from KPMG who have had 
experiences with fraudulent financial reporting and with asset 
misappropriations. This research established that there were general 
conditions, motivations and attitudes, which could predict the probability of 
material irregularities.  For example, they found the primary conditions that 
encouraged fraud included dominated decisions by senior management and 
weak internal controls.12   Finally, Loebbecke et al. (1989) compiled the 
primary set of attitudes, or ethical values, of persons with positions of 
authority that would allow them to seek out, or partake in, management fraud 
which included dishonest management, personality anomalies, and lies or 
evasiveness, particularly to auditors.13   Loebbecke et al. (1989) found in 75% 
of observations, there were indications of decision-making domination by one 
person or small group acting in concert and weak internal controls. Amongst a 
broader study of fraud indicators, the literature identifies three groups of red 
flags capturing a specific dimension of the financial reporting culture within 
organizations: aggressive accounting practices, management ethical attitudes, 
and the relationship between company managers and their auditor. These will 
be discussed in the following sections and are the focal point of this study. 
                                                 
11 Bell and Carcello’s (2000) work notes that there are several risk factors presented in the 
authoritative guidance and elsewhere in the literature that are not particularly effective in 
discriminating between fraud and non-fraud engagements.   
12 Other primary conditions included: (i) major transactions were taken advantage of; (ii)  
there were business dealings with related parties; (iii) internal controls were weak; and  (iv) 
transactions were difficult to audit. 
13 Other primary attitudes / rationalizations included: (i) emphasis on earnings projections; (ii) 
prior-year irregularities; and (iii) aggressive attitude to financial reporting. 
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Aggressive Accounting practices and Fraud 
 
Internal controls, particularly over critical accounting areas, are able to 
codify and capture expectations on legal behaviour, increase the likelihood of 
detection, punish transgressions, and reward desired behaviour (McKendall et 
al. 2002, AICPA 2001).  Holmes et al. (2002) analyzed 2,600 cases of fraud 
and noted that organizations with lax management attitudes are more likely to 
be victimized internally, by both management and non-management 
employees.  Further, the fraud schemes used were more complex, pervasive, 
and involved collusion in situations with lax management attitudes.  Managers 
with strong incentives to commit fraud prefer weak controls in order to 
disguise their fraudulent behaviour. Bell and Carcello (2000) confirm that this 
combination of weak control and aggressive financial reporting contribute 
significantly to fraud. And, Loebbecke et al. (1989) found that an aggressive, 
senior management attitude towards financial reporting was an important 
factor associated with the risk of material irregularities.   
 
The SEC has found that improper revenue recognition is the most 
common method of accounting fraud, and that aggressive financial estimates 
made by management (involving estimates of costs and expenses), is the 
second most common fraud scheme (SEC 2003).14   It is, therefore, likely that 
auditors will mistrust the financial reporting environment whenever 
                                                 
14 The United States has the world’s largest capital markets and also some of the tightest 
regulatory controls in the area of corporate fraud.  The SEC publishes its enforcement actions 
and this provides a first window to explore the characteristics of firms accused of, or found to 
have, committed corporate fraud.  The SEC has noted, that a significant number of 
enforcement actions, involve violations of reporting requirements, relate to inadequate books 
and records, and involve improper accounting controls (SEC 2003).  Similarly, the SEC has 
found that the most common methods of fraudulent financial reporting are: 
(1) overstatement of  revenues and assets 
(2) understatement of costs and expenses and liabilities 
(3) manipulation of the timing of when transactions are recorded or events are 
recognized 
(4) incorrect measurement or estimation of the effects of transactions or events 
(5) misapplication of generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) 
(6) misrepresentation or omission of information material to users of financial 
information. 
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 indications of aggressive accounting practices arise, especially those involving 
the revenue recognition process and the determination of significant 
accounting estimates (consistent with SAS 99 and ISA 240). 
 
Victor and Cullen (1988) have noted that ethical behaviour cannot 
simply be explained by individual characteristics. It seems inappropriate for 
organizations to exclusively rely on individual integrity to guide behaviour, 
and thus, organizations must provide the context to support ethical, and 
discourage unethical, behaviour (Butterfield et al. 2000; Dallas 2003). This 
support can be given by the company’s ethical climate, consisting of the 
ethical meaning employees attach to organizational (financial reporting) 
standards, practices and procedures, including the managerial behaviour and 
reward systems that reflect the corporate norms and values (Barnett and 
Vaicys 2000; Dallas 2003).   
 
 
Senior Management Ethical Conduct and Fraud 
 
Management fraud has been found to be typically committed by top 
management (SEC 2003, Loebbecke et al. 1989).  From a legal perspective, 
firms with executives who ignored, condoned, rewarded, or participated, in 
past instances of wrongdoing, will likely be recidivists due to the 
predisposition of their behaviour and attitude (Baucus 1994).  Further, Baucus 
(1994) reports that firms with highly committed employees and a corporate 
culture reinforcing illegal activities tend also to be predisposed to illegal 
behaviour.  The legal view also reconciles with the view found in the audit 
literature.  Managers, who are generally dishonest and are evasive towards 
their auditors, are more likely to engage in financial fraud (Loebbecke et al. 
1989).  Other audit studies – such as Bell and Carcello (2000) – have found, 
through matched-fraud and no-fraud samples, that overly-evasive or dishonest 
management is an important, fraud red flag. 
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The ethics and conduct of senior managers, in a corporation, sets the 
overall, ethical tone in an organization.  It is not corporations that commit 
financial fraud; rather, fraud is perpetrated by the people within the 
corporation.  It is generally understood that the primary reason why people 
commit fraud – especially white collar crime – is money (usually, from 
bonuses or options linked to the appreciation of stock prices), power, 
advancement, and hubris (Baucus 1994).  The sample of auditor assessments 
of firms investigated in this study provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
whether firms with a higher propensity to commit fraud are more likely to 
demonstrate indications of ethical misconduct (mistrust).   
 
Empirical research suggests that fraud red flags associated with 
management attitudes and behaviours carry more weight than motivation and 
condition red flags (Deshmukh and Talluru 1998).  There is also evidence that 
the ethical tone in an organization is largely derived from senior management 
attitudes (Cohen et al. 2002).  Research notes that a focus on long-term gains 
and idealist principles (rather than short-term gains and relativism) should 
have a positive contribution on reducing earnings manipulations (Elias 2002).  
Further, organizations should promote idealist values and have these be re-
enforced through a long-term focus on the business.  In an audit setting, 
management integrity assessments and concerns have been shown to impact 
the persuasiveness of evidence sought and the auditor's assessment of 
management integrity improved the likelihood of detecting misstatements 
(Kizirian et al. 2005). 
 
Research in psychology and organizational behaviour has 
demonstrated that individuals make egocentric interpretations of fairness and 
ethics.  In situations involving earnings management, where no consensus on 
acceptable behaviour exists, multiple interpretations of ethical actions are 
likely to arise (Kaplan 2001).  Organizations, therefore, must reduce the moral 
ambiguity surrounding improper financial reporting and ethical compliance 
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 conduct by providing the right guidance and decision support mechanisms that 
guide organizational behaviour.15  Further, Kaplan (2001) has noted there are 
ethical disagreements and a lack of consensus between shareholders and non-
shareholders on what constitutes ethical behaviour and the justifications and 
rationalizations justifying such actions.   
 
Fraudulent financial reporting starts with small ethical transgressions 
(Treadway Commission 1987; Merchant and Rockness 1994).  Trevino and 
Youngblood (1990) concluded that ethical decision-making behaviour in 
organizations results from a complex interplay of individual differences, how 
individuals think about ethical decisions, and how organizations manage 
rewards and punishment.  They found that ethical decision making was 
influenced directly by cognitive moral development.  In their path analysis, 
they also found (1) evidence that Locus of Control16 influenced ethical 
decision making directly and through outcome expectancies; and (2) vicarious 
rewards affected ethical decision making indirectly as it influenced outcome 
expectancy (no significant linkage was found for vicarious punishment).       
 
                                                 
15 Ethical conduct controls within an organization generally are associated with the actions 
and control practices of organizations which shape the ethical climate.  An organization’s 
ethical climate refers to the ethical meaning which employees attach to organizational 
policies, practices, and procedures that determine the ethical conflicts that are to be 
considered, the process by which such conflicts are resolved, and the characteristics of the 
resolution (Dallas 2003).  Schnatterly 2003 notes that clarity of policies and procedures and 
formal cross-company communication significantly reduces the likelihood of a crime. It is 
important to consider the relationship between ethics and the law.  Generally, illegal 
behaviour is a subset of unethical behaviours, as laws are a means for society to capture our 
moral standards (Baucus 1994).  Therefore, given the importance of the matter, one would 
have expected that regulators and industry would have detailed best practice guidance on how 
to organize the ethical and legal compliance functions within an organization.  Such lack of 
guidance is also present in the academic literature. 
16 Trevino and Youngblood (1990) note that individuals with internal Locus of Control 
(“LOC”) are more likely to do what they think is right and to tolerate discomfort or penalty for 
doing so.  The concept of internal-external LOC classifies individuals as either attributing the 
cause of or control over events to themselves (“internals”) or to their surrounding situation 
(“externals”). The characteristics of “externals” are closely related to the surrounding 
environment.  Ashford et al. (1989) compared “externals” vs. “internals” and found that  
“internals” generally see environmental situations as being less important and believe that they 
have the power to counteract environmental threats. 
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 Moral reasoning17 is an important element that affects economic 
decisions, including fraudulent ones (Rutledge and Karim 1999).  Uddin and 
Gillette (2002) found evidence that moral reasoning had some effect on 
intentions of Chief Financial Officers to report fraudulently on financial 
statements.  They also noted having a greater number of high moral reasoners 
in an organization can decrease the probability of fraud as these individuals 
are less influenced by social norms.  They suggest that addressing the personal 
attitudes and subjective norms in an organization can be a critical determinant 
that prevents fraudulent behaviour.  It follows that corporations may affect a 
person’s reasoning at the conventional level through its policies and practices 
by asserting or establishing the definition of what is socially acceptable within 
the work environment.18  Under Kohlberg’s theory of moral development 
(1969), researchers have found that managers use lower levels of reasoning in 
business contexts than in non- business contexts and that managers typically 
reason at the conventional level (Weber 1990).  
 
Pant et al. (2002) suggest that rather than broad attempts being made to 
change the moral development of managers, efforts should be placed on 
sensitizing them to moral issues and how to address these.  In turn, this would 
suggest that an Ethics and Compliance program is necessary within all 
organizations, but such programs can only work if they are sponsored by 
senior management.  Because of the authority and status of top management, 
ethics researchers suggest that a high ranking officer in the organization 
oversee ethical compliance, and that such matters be discussed at the Board 
and Audit Committee level (Dallas 2003).  Generally, as summarized by 
Dallas (2003), ethics and ethical compliance systems require consideration of: 
                                                 
17 Kohlberg (1969) developed a theory of moral development in which persons progress in 
moral reasoning through three levels: (1) Pre-conventional level, where labels of “good” or 
“bad” are interpreted in terms of physical consequences (punishment, reward) or in terms of 
physical power; (2)  Conventional level, where active support of the fixed rules or authority in 
a society becomes the reference criteria; and (3) Post-conventional level, where the individual 
makes clear effort toward autonomous moral principles with validity apart from the authority 
of the groups or persons who hold them and apart from individual identifications.   
18 Moral philosophy can be described as the extent to which an individual is a relativist and/or 
idealist.  High relativists (Forsyth, 1980) believe that the morality of an action depends upon 
the particular circumstances involved and not on moral/universal absolutes.  High idealists 
believe that moral actions should and do have positive consequences and that is it always 
wrong to pursue a course of action that will cause harm (or affect the welfare of) others. 
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 (i) organizational values; (ii) the nature of organizational decision making; (iii) 
the values and behaviours of the organization’s leaders; (d) the organization’s 
reward systems; (e) the handling of conflicts of interest; (f) the availability of 
ethical guidance for employees; and (g) the organization’s monitoring system. 
 
Management-auditor relation and Fraud 
 
Loebbecke et al. (1989) noted that the relationship between a client’s 
management and the auditor is an important indicator of heightened fraud risk, 
including frequent disputes with the auditor, undue pressure on auditor, and 
disrespectful attitudes towards the auditor. Bell and Carcello (2000) confirm 
this finding and concluded that previous audit experiences had significant 
predictive abilities for the detection of current fraudulent behaviours, 
especially when management had been overly evasive in responding to audit 
inquiries and when management had engaged in frequent disputes with 
auditors. The strength of audit clients’ corporate governance system and the 
strictness of their management control philosophy are related to greater 
willingness on the part of the auditor to recommend client acceptance and 
more likeliness to reduce substantive testing (Cohen and Hanno 2000). 
Auditors also appear to react to integrity information about a client’s Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO): the CFO’s integrity is negatively related to auditors’ 
risk judgments and to recommendations for increasing audit extent and audit 
fee (Beaulieu 2001). Anderson et al. (2004) found that high incentive 
situations lead auditors to believe less on explanations given, than low 
incentive situation. A quantified explanation is viewed more likely to be 
sufficient than a non-quantified explanation. Audit planning decisions appear 
to be solely influenced by incentive system and expected resulting 
aggressiveness in financial accounting. Anderson et al. (2004) also found that 
when incentives for earnings management are low, auditors appear to fail in 
considering critical explanatory information contained in the quantified 
explanations. This study therefore expects auditors’ judgments to be partly 
influenced by pre-audit information and experience about the client’s 
behaviour, conduct and specific audit related circumstances. To do their job 
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 effectively, auditors rely on representations from managers to validate their 
sample results.  If managers are not open, interfere in the audit process, or are 
not cooperative with the auditors, then this could indicate a heightened risk of 
financial fraud. Managers who have a tense, or opaque relationship with their 
auditors, will tend to have a higher probability for financial fraud. 
 
This study predicts the propensity of audit clients’ managers to engage 
in fraudulent financial reporting based on three groups of trust indicators: 
aggressive accounting practices, senior management ethical conduct and the 
management-auditor relation (hypothesis 2A and 2B). Following the work of 
Bell and Carcello (2000) and Loebbecke et al. (1989), this study tests whether 
independent estimates of these three classes of fraud risk (and trust) indicators 
(Xj-risks)  are significant and have equal weighting in determining the 
propensity for fraud (Model 1).  
 
 
Yi = β0 + βjXij + εij      [MODEL 1] 
where 
i: 1..N, denoting the sample of auditor client acceptance and continuance risk 
assessments. 
j: 1..J, denoting the number of risk factors being measured in the model. 
N: number of auditor assessments of their clients performed over a period of z 
years 
Xj: denoting risk factors (management attitude and mistrust indicators) 
associated with the propensity to engage in fraud.19 
Yi : denoting the dependent measurement of the propensity to engage in fraud. 
βj:  represents the independent estimate of the independent risk factor Xj 
 
                                                 
19 Within this study, indications of mistrust, residing within an organization’s financial 
reporting culture, capture: (1) senior management integrity and ethical conduct; (2) honesty 
and openness of management to the auditor; (3) level of managerial experience and skill; (4) 
aggressiveness in revenue recognition practices; and (5) historical reliability of accounting 
estimates.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed. 
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 Hypothesis 1A:  βj > 0 for independent 
estimates of Xj 
Hypothesis 1B:  βj = βj+1     
 
In addition, these indicators of heightened fraud risk are grouped into 
constructs (γj) to test the overall relative importance on fraud, and the 
individual contribution of ethical and accounting principles.  Specifically, 
three elements influencing financial reporting quality and capturing 
dimensions of trust and managerial attitudes are grouped and measured 
through specific constructs: ethical tone of senior management, aggressive 
accounting, and auditor-management relationship.  Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are presented. 
 
Hypothesis 2A:  γj > 0 for independent 
estimates of Xj 
Hypothesis 2B:  γethical_tone = γacctg_principles  
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This section is composed of three subsections.  The first section 
discusses the auditor acceptance and continuance process undertaken by a Big 
Four accounting firm in the Netherlands.  The second section gives the sample 
composition and presents some high-level, descriptive analytics on the sample.  
Finally, the third section describes the empirical proxies for fraud, unethical 
management conduct and tone set in the organization, excessive compensation 
pressures, and a poor control environment. 
 
Auditor Acceptance and Continuance Process 
 
Risk assessment processes are critical to an auditor’s design of 
procedures to detect material, financial statement misstatements, whether 
caused by fraud or otherwise.  International audit standards require that an 
auditor obtain an understanding of audit risk and its components: inherent risk, 
control risk, and detection risk (ISA 400).  Risk assessment systems at Big 
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 Four accounting firms generally consider all key audit and fraud risk 
indicators, as suggested by audit standards, either in isolation or through 
separate questionnaires (Shelton et al. 2001).  This study closely the approach 
employed by Bedard and Johnstone (2004) who used engagement partners’ 
assessments of their clients, as part of their client acceptance and annual audit, 
continuance, risk assessment, process to examine the relationship between 
earnings manipulation and corporate governance variables.   
 
The data used in this study was derived from audit partner assessments 
of their clients during the acceptance and audit continuance process, 
performed during the years 2002 to 2004, at a Big Four Dutch accounting 
firm. During this process, partners at the firm perform their preliminary 
assessments of the various risk factors affecting the probability of an 
inadequate, audit opinion for particular clients.  The risk assessment is 
completed on a standardized, electronic form which requests that the audit 
partner select from a range of choices, or risk judgements, based on uniform 
definitions (adequacy of Big 4 risk assessments discussed by Shelton et al 
2001).  Once the acceptance and continuance form is completed by an audit 
manager or the audit partner, the partners must sign the form, and, in certain 
instances, the form is subject to additional internal, Firm reviews in 
accordance internal quality, review guidelines.  Once the form has been 
approved, audit partners and managers then proceed to design an audit plan 
based on any heightened risk conditions identified through the process.    
 
 
Sample Selection and Description 
 
In total, 5,603 acceptance and continuance risk evaluations were 
included in this study with only 3% of the assessments discarded due to 
missing information.  These risk assessments include public and private 
companies, foreign and domestically-owned entities, and cover multiple 
industries.  They are a sub-set of all the audit engagements performed by the 
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 Big Four firm for the years 2002 through 2004.  Excluded from the sample 
were all assessments performed for very small clients (total audit hours less 
than 500), assessments for non-financial audits, and other services.  The 
remainder of the sample population covers the assessments of approximately 
150 audit partners.  In the Netherlands, there is a general statutory audit 
requirement, unless entities qualify for a “small entity” exception, 
(approximately €8 million revenues and €4 million in assets).  Due to 
confidentiality limitations, information such as the client name, size, audit 
fees, and other sensitive information was removed from the data provided to 
the researcher.  The Big Four firm uses a proprietary algorithm to arrive at a 
risk score, and to identify the indicators of increased risk, which are to be 
considered by the auditor as part of the planning, execution, and completion of 
the audit.  The outputs of such an algorithm, and the ultimate performance of 
the auditor, were not observable nor the subject of this study.20 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
The participating, Big Four accounting firm’s client acceptance and 
audit continuance risk assessment process requires audit partners to answer 
questions on a number of risk factors.  Certain of these risk factors are the 
focus of this study (refer to Appendix 1 for full variable definitions).  They 
are:  
(i) risk associated with the ethical conduct of managers based 
on perceptions and known instances of potential misconduct 
(X1; IntegrityAndEthics) and risk associated with the 
experience and skill of the management team (X2; 
MgtExperienceDepth) 
(ii) risk associated with aggressive accounting estimates (X3; 
AcctgEstimateReliability) and revenue recognition practices 
(X4; RevenueRecognition) 
                                                 
20 Note that auditors are required to perform specific risk evaluations and design appropriate 
procedures to meet SAS 99 and ISA 240 requirements dealing with fraud.  The evaluations at 
the sampled Big 4 firm are based on initial risk indications arising from the acceptance and 
continuance system.  
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 (iii) risk arising from the lack of openness, trust, and 
transparency between an auditor and its audit client (X5; 
AuditRelationship).   
(iv) the risk from management inclinations to intentionally 
misstate financial statements – the proxy for actual fraud (Y; 
MgtInclin2IntentMisstate). 
 
Risk evaluation is based on a fully-anchored, five-point risk level 
instrument, based on a standardized set of framed statements (risk 
descriptions) and includes an explanation of that particular risk level.  Most 
empirical research has tended to measure fraud red flags using binary 
variables.  Deshmukh and Talluru (1998) note that, in the real world, the 
differences which exist in certain red flags have been largely ignored in 
researcher measurement and research models.  For example, during an audit, it 
becomes necessary to consider internal controls on a continuous or categorical 
scale, rather than on a dichotomous, binary scale. 
  
 The empirical proxy used to measure the propensity for fraud in this 
study is derived from one question in the auditor acceptance and continuance 
questionnaire.  This specific variable measures management inclinations to 
intentionally misstate financial statements.  It is based on the client’s approach 
to financial reporting and past experience which the auditor may have had, or 
observed, with their client.  The first two risk levels of the dependent measure 
capture the importance managers place on financial reporting; the highest risk 
levels capture manager disregard or observed attempts to distort or hide 
material information (refer to Appendix I and Figure 3).     
 
All risks are measured on a five point scale, from lowest to highest, 
with framed statements to assist the auditor in the process.  A Likert scale 
from 1 (lowest risk) to 5 (highest risk) is used as a basis for analysis.  Auditor 
risk statements are framed to capture auditor perceptions, observations, and 
suspicious at the lower risk levels.  At the higher risk levels auditor recall, 
evidence of “red flags”, and past incidents, are used by auditors to as a basis 
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 for their risk assessments.  Therefore, this study relies on auditor perceptions, 
observations, and auditor recall as the basis of analysis and conclusion.   
 
To validate whether auditors were conscious of their fraud risk 
assessments (and responses to the dependent variable in this study - 
MgtInclin2IntentMisstate) and acted upon such assessments through additional 
audit safe-guards, two groups of sample ANOVA mean comparison tests were 
performed.  The first test examined whether audit opinions were significantly 
affected by higher fraud risk assessments.  It was found that higher risk 
assessments had the following statistical differences (1% level) with the rest of 
the sample: (i) more modified audit opinions; (ii) more explanatory paragraphs 
within audit opinions; (iii) there was more communication by the auditors to 
the Board of potential fraud or illegal acts; (iv) there had been more prior 
auditor disagreements, resignations, and prior auditor limitations of responses; 
and (v) there were more prior year errors and account restatements.  In 
addition, a second group of tests for external validity of the dependent variable 
(using ANOVA means comparison, at the 1% level of significance) suggest 
that auditors respond to higher fraud risk assessments by refusing to have their 
audit scope changed, having more complex negotiations with their clients, and 
by implementing additional internal Firm quality controls (e.g., use of 
concurrent partners).  In summary, there is evidence to suggest that auditors 
act on their fraud risk assessments and it establishes the external validity of the 
dependent variable for this study. 
 
 
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
The discussion of the results is presented in three sections.  The first 
section provides a risk profile of the variables under study and evidence of the 
positive association between fraud red flags.  The second section presents 
evidence that unethical management actions, aggressive accounting practices, 
and strained auditor relations are important indications of increased fraud risk.  
The last section provides evidence of the relative importance of ethical 
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manager conduct and accounting practices, in relation to the varying levels of 
fraud risk. 
 
 
 
The importance of management attitudes 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the indications of mistrust 
and managerial attitudes, and related risk judgments, across the 5,603 firm 
auditor assessments.  Descriptive results of the sampled population indicate 
that relatively few clients were assessed as having high risk levels in the 
variables measured in this study.  More specifically, 0.8% of auditor 
assessments had a low level of management experience and skill and 1.1% 
were perceived as exhibiting low levels of integrity and ethical behaviour.   In 
the variables which captured aggressive accounting, 0.9% were assessed as 
having aggressively-structured revenue recognition practices, and 1.3% were 
assessed as having consistently, unreliable accounting estimates.  In addition, 
0.4% of entities were considered to have strained, audit-management 
relationships.   
 
Table 2 provides the Pearson Correlation coefficients for all indicators 
of mistrust, measuring the managerial attitudes which shape financial 
reporting cultures of organizations.  Consistent with what the literature 
suggests, all mistrust indications have a strong positive correlation with the 
risk of fraud (significance at the 1% level).  Surprisingly, however, is the 
magnitude of the correlations assessed by auditors, generally ranging from 0.3 
to 0.4.  As well, the ethical integrity and conduct of senior management is seen 
as the single most significant element in fraud risk (0.47), followed by the 
quality of the audit relationship (0.4).   
 TABLE 1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
(1) The Acceptance and Continuance process at the sampled Big 4 firm asks the auditor for an assessment of specific risk conditions.  For each 
of these questions the auditor is requested to provide an assessment across five categories: Lowest Risk, Low Risk, Some Risk, High Risk, 
and Highest Risk.  Each of these risk categories contains a brief description of what is meant by each of the particular risk levels, which 
frames the assessment for the auditor.  Generally, the framing statement associated with the low and lowest risk level contains positively 
framed statements representing good qualities that the auditor believes to be present.  The high and highest risk generally refer to specific 
(more tangible) auditor indications of negative qualities associated with the question and perceived to pose risk of issuing an incorrect audit 
opinion.  For the purpose of this study, a 5-point ordinal Likert Scale [1-5] is used to represent lowest to highest risk conditions respectively.  
(2) The higher risk sample contains sample cases for which the auditor has indicated that the management’s inclination to misstate is 3 or higher 
on the five-point Likert scale, representing some to highest risk (refer to Appendix I). 
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TABLE 2: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (FULL SAMPLE; N: 5,603) 
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) MgtInclin2IntentMisstate 1
(2) IntegrityAndEthics .472(**) 1
(3) MgtExperienceDepth .315(**) .355(**) 1
(4) AcctgEstimateReliability .336(**) .325(**) .287(**) 1
(5) RevenueRecognition .296(**) .255(**) .203(**) .294(**) 1
(6) AuditRelationship .404(**) .334(**) .238(**) .276(**) .302(**) 1
 
Pearson correlation coefficients; (**)  denotes significance of correlation coefficient at 1% level (2-tailed test);  N: 5,603 
 
 
Note: Consistent with the above table, Pearson correlation coefficients at the lower risk sub-sample (N: 5,038) are all positive, amounts 
consistent, and all correlations remain significant.  At the higher fraud risk sub-sample (N: 565), all correlation coefficients are lower (but 
continue to be significant at the 5% level); however, there is no significant correlation between MgtInclin2IntentMisstate and 
MgtExperienceDepth (i.e., the experience and skill of a senior management team is not related to the risk of fraud) 
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These findings are consistent with the Loebbecke et al. (1989) model 
for material irregularities and auditor observations.  Interestingly, all mistrust 
indications and fraud red flags are statistically correlated with each other at the 
1% level.  These observations suggest that indications of an untrustworthy 
financial reporting culture are considered by auditors to be strongly associated 
with (and perhaps can deter) fraud. 
 
A multivariate analysis of fraud risk components 
 
Table 3 provides the results of the linear regression between various 
management attitude and trust indications – unethical management conduct, 
inexperienced management, aggressive revenue practices, aggressive 
estimates, and honesty with the auditors – and the risk of fraud.  The results 
confirm that there is a positive association between indications of mistrust and 
adverse managerial attitudes and fraud risk.  The model is significant (F: 552; 
p<0.01) and the explanatory potential is high (R2: 0.33).  All the Betas are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results confirm that auditors do perceive the lack of honesty, 
openness and transparency between management and themselves as an 
important element increasing fraud risk (βTOTAL: 0.22; p<0.01).  As 
demonstrated in Table 3, this is the second most important variable 
determining the risk of fraud.  The implication is that auditor assessments may 
be capturing an element of management culture in an organization which is 
useful to auditors in assessing the risk of fraud.  And, at the highest risk levels, 
auditors rely on tangible evidence rather than perceptions alone.  An 
alternative view would be to say that the measures of fraud risk are biased by 
the perceptions of auditors.  This alternative view is abandoned after re-
running the regression model with a sub-sample of the higher fraud risk 
assessments (565 higher-risk assessment forms; β not significant; Table 3) 
which shows that the audit relationship is not perceived as an important factor 
at higher levels of fraud risk. 
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TABLE 3: MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS ACROSS FULL SAMPLE AND HIGHER/LOWER RISK SUB-
SAMPLES 
 
 
 In examining a smaller, sub-sample of higher fraud risk assessments 
(Table 3, middle column), neither the quality of the audit relationship, nor the 
level of management experience are found to be statistically significant 
(βHIGH).  This finding appears unusual as practitioner and academic guidance 
would suggest that strained auditor-client relationships (built on honesty and 
trust) and inexperienced managers are an important element in higher, fraud 
risk levels.  An alternative explanation is that auditors need additional red flag 
information besides and above the “soft” indicators of auditor-client 
relationship and managers’ experience before classifying clients in the high 
risk categories.  
 
Results on Table 3 also confirm that aggressive management actions 
are perceived an important mistrust indicator associated with fraud.  More 
specifically, aggressive revenue recognition practices are found to be an 
important and statistically-significant managerial attitudes associated with 
fraud risk (βTOTAL: 0.10; p<0.01), alongside biased accounting estimates 
(βTOTAL: 0.12; p<0.01).  This finding is consistent with the observations from 
SEC enforcement actions which note that these two types of practices are 
noted in a large number of financial fraud allegations (SEC 2003).  Further, 
this finding lends additional support to Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Bell and 
Carcello (2000), who noted that aggressive financial reporting practices are an 
important element which may lead to material irregularities. 
 
The regression results confirm that manager ethical misconduct is the 
most important element perceived to drive the risk of fraud (βTOTAL: 0.30; 
p<0.01).  In addition, inexperience and lack of managerial skill are noted as 
additional conditions or factors which are also, independently, significantly 
associated with higher fraud risk assessments (βTOTAL: 0.10; p<0.01).  This 
finding is not surprising if one considers that various internal control 
frameworks, such as COSO, rate the control environment and relevant 
company-level controls (which are set by senior management) as the most 
important elements of control within an organization.  However, this study 
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 provides tangible evidence of the importance of both the ethics and experience 
of managers in determining the risk of fraud.  For example, the standard 
βTOTAL for the two variables representing aggressive accounting practices 
amounts to 0.22, compared to 0.40 for the ethical tone and experience of 
managers. 
 
In summary, this study provides evidence that two groups of 
managerial attitudes and indications of the trustworthiness of an organization’s 
financial reporting culture – ethical conduct of managers and aggressive 
accounting practices – are very important elements associated with higher 
fraud risk assessments.  If auditors had their say in the world, and their 
perceptions were accurate representations of reality, they would choose to 
have more ethical management conduct first, before focusing on aggressive 
accounting practices.  With new standards for communication to audit 
committees on critical accounting and control areas, there is clear, empirical 
evidence to suggest that manager conduct and critical accounting practices 
should continue to be at the top of the list of matters to be communicated to 
governance bodies, in an effort to minimize the risk of fraud. 
 
Consistency across fraud risk levels 
 
The previous section noted that there were differences in the relative 
importance which auditors attributed to various fraud risk factors.  It was 
documented that regression results differ between the full sample, and the sub-
sample containing only the higher fraud risk assessments.  These regression 
results showed, that the quality of the auditor relationship with management 
and the level of management experience, were not perceived by auditors as a 
statistically significant element in their assessment of higher fraud risk 
situations.  To isolate risk factors, and to focus on the ethical conduct and tone 
set by managers versus aggressive accounting practices,  a simple, structural 
equation model was created (to test  hypotheses 2A and 2B). 
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Structural equations modelling (SEM) combines regression with factor 
analysis, simultaneously.  The main advantage of SEM over multiple 
regressions is the ability to test a set of relations among variables, 
simultaneously.  This cannot be done using standard regression, due to the 
complex set of simultaneous relations.  SEM has been used and discussed in 
previous studies and in a similar context (Gillett and Uddin 2005; Johnstone 
2000; Dusenbury et al. 2000; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004).  For this study, 
AMOS version 6.0 is used as the vehicle to model the structural relationships 
between ethical conduct of managers and aggressive accounting practices.  
The SEM model uses four constructs: 
(1) a construct for the ethical conduct of managers, which is derived from the 
variables capturing the ethical conduct of senior management (λ:1) and the 
degree of management experience and skill; 
(2) a construct for aggressive accounting practices, which is derived from the 
variables capturing revenue recognition practices and reliability of 
accounting estimates (λ:1); 
(3) a construct for audit relationship which has one variable linked to it;21  
(4) a construct for the interaction between management ethical risks and 
aggressive accounting; 
(5) a construct for fraud risk which is measured by the variable measuring 
management inclination to intentionally misstate financial statements.22 
 
21 For latent variables within the SEM model which have only a single indicator variable  
(constructs for audit relationship risk and accounting control risk), these are represented like 
any other latent variable, except the error term for the single indicator variable which 
constrained to have a mean of 0 and a variance fixed at an ‘arbitrary’ value times its variance 
(Jöreskog et al. 1993 suggest that using an arbitrary value, or estimate based on reliability, is a 
more reasonable assumption than the assumption of a zero error).   For Audit Relationship, the 
assumed variable reliability has been set at approximately 50%, as the assessment is largely 
based on auditor perceptions, rather than established facts (and this variable is meant to 
capture multiple dimensions affecting other latent variables); therefore the error variance 
mapped in the model is represented by approximately 50% times the variance observed of the 
underlying variable across the relevant sub-sample.  This ‘random’ percentage was chosen 
based on the stability of the model (increasing the reliability of other constructs) and the 
plausibility that audit relationship risk is a difficult-to-measure metric of trust and honesty.  
For the higher risk sub-sample, construct reliability of 80% was chosen, as the underlying 
variable relies more on tangible observations and facts (refer to Figure 3). 
22 Construct reliability has been set at 90% for the full sample and lower-risk sub-sample.  For 
the higher risk sub-sample, a 50% reliability was necessary for model stability. 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
Fraud related risk factors 
βjLOW βjHIGH βjTOTAL H1A: βj > 0
H1B:  
βj = βj+1 
γjTOTAL γjHIGH γjLOW 
H2A:  
γj > 0 
H2B: 
γethical_tone = 
γacctg_principles 
Management Ethical Tone          
IntegrityAndEthics 0.24 0.20 0.30 Supported Not Supported 
MgtExperienceDepth 0.08 - 0.10 Supported Not Supported 
0.71 0.83 0.45 Supported 
                  
AuditRelationship 0.18 - 0.22 Supported Not Supported       
          
Aggressive Accounting                 
RevenueRecognition 0.12 0.08 0.10 Supported Not Supported 
AcctgEstimateReliability 0.12 0.08 0.12 Supported Not Supported 0.37 - 0.60 Supported 
Not  
 
Supported 
Management Ethical Tone 
* Aggressive Accounting 
     - 0.28 - 0.47 - 0.21   
R2: 0.33 0.06 0.23 
  
0.82 0.26 0.77   
χ2:    
  
66 28 50   
 Results of the overall model confirm (Table 4; Figure 1) that the ethical 
conduct of senior management (γTOTAL: 0.71; p<0.01) is approximately two times 
more important than aggressive accounting practices (γTOTAL: 0.37; p<0.01), even 
after considering variable inter-relationships.   The model is significant and 
acceptable (AGFI: 0.98; RMR: 0.01; TLI: 0.97; NFI: 0.99; all acceptable levels per 
the literature, particularly observations of Hu and Bentler 1999; construct reliability 
above 0.6).23  In addition, the explanatory power of the model is significantly 
higher than regression (squared multiple correlation or R2: 0.82).   
                                                
It is important to note that the interaction of management ethical tone risk 
and aggressive accounting has a significant, negative direct relationship with fraud 
risk (γTOTAL: - 0.28; p<0.01).  However, the total standard effect of all constructs on 
fraud risk is all positive, suggesting that the interaction effect is a compensating risk 
factor.  To gain insight as to what may be causing such a negative effect, a general 
linear model (GLM) was run with all variables in the measurement model and 
including all main and interaction effects.  This GLM model (F: 886; p<0.01; R2: 
0.95) demonstrates that all main and interaction effects are statistically significant at 
the 10% level.  Upon close examination, the GLM shows five “conditions” or 
“dosages,” between management integrity/tone variables and aggressive 
accounting, which are negative and significant at the 5% level.  In all of these 
situations, lower levels of managerial integrity risk interact with lower levels of 
 
23 There is no consensus as to the set of indices which work best as each test statistic poses 
advantages and disadvantages, just as there is no consensus on the effect of factors such as sample 
size and normality violations on different fit indices.   Kline (1998: 130) recommends at least four 
tests: (1) chi-square (χ2); (2) goodness of fit (GFI), normed fit index (NFI), or comparative fit index 
(CFI); (3) the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), also called the NNFI (nonnormed fit index); and (4) root 
mean square residual (RMR).  For the χ2 statistic, obtaining a probability of greater than 0.05 
indicates a good fit.  The value of the χ2 statistic is limited because it is very sensitive to sample size 
and distributional assumptions (Hu and Bentler 1999).  For other statistics (GFI, NFI, CFI, TLI) a 
cut-off value of 0.9 is often used, however some argue that the cut-off value should be greater than 
0.95 for TLI, IFI, and CFI (Hu and Bentler 1999).  For the use of RMR, a cut-off value of 0.08 
appears an adequate cut-off value and a value of 0.06 for root mean square residual statistic 
(RMSEA).  McDonald and Ho (2002) have outlined four problems with fit indices which included 
an observation that there is no established mathematical basis for using them, no compelling ground 
for using absolute or relative indices, alternative measures may lead to inconsistent decisions, and a 
misfit can occur due to concentrated mis-specified parts of a model. 
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 revenue recognition and accounting estimate reliability risk, producing a negative, 
significant effect on fraud risk.24  In addition, in three situations, lower revenue 
recognition risks compound with lower accounting estimate risks, to produce a 
negative, significant effect.25  In summary, risks appear to compound in a non-
linear manner, specifically, better management integrity levels and lower levels of 
aggressive accounting appear to produce a decline in fraud risk, over-and-above 
that expected when considering first order variable relationships (main effects).  
And this is what can be seen from the negative interaction effect (γTOTAL: - 0.28). 
 
These findings are significant because they provide evidence of the 
importance of ethics and aggressive accounting practices in determining the risk of 
fraud.  These findings are consistent with Loebbecke et al. (1989), Bell and 
Carcello (2000), and Baucus (1994), but extend that research by providing 
quantification of the relative importance of two, critical, risk areas and managerial 
attitudes affecting fraud.  More specifically, the ethical conduct of senior 
management is approximately two times more important than aggressive accounting 
practices in determining the risk of fraud. 
 
                                                 
24 Note that all two-way interactions between IntegrityAndEthics (IE), RevenueRecognition (RR), 
and AcctgEstimateReliability (AE) were negative and significant – IE2*AE3: -0.71; IE3*AE1: -1.18; 
IE3*AE2: -0.98; IE3*AE3: -1.06; IE1*RR2: -1.25.  Note that the numbers associated with IE, RR, 
and AE, refer to risk levels, where ‘1’ denotes lowest risk and ‘3’ denotes some risk, as per 
Appendix I. 
25 The only three significant interactions (5% level) between RevenueRecognition (RR) and 
AcctgEstimateReliability (AE) were – RR2*AE2: -0.85; RR2*AE3: -0.78; RR3*AE3: -0.72.  Note 
that the numbers associated with RR and AE, refer to risk levels, where ‘1’ denotes lowest risk and 
‘3’ denotes some risk, as per Appendix I. 
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 FIGURE 1: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL FOR THE FULL 
SAMPLE (N: 5,603) 
 
 
In order to go further in understanding auditor thinking, SEM was applied to 
a sub-sample of lower-risk assessments (refer to Figure 2; 5,038 or 90% of the 
sampled population).  Interestingly, the strength of the ethical conduct of senior 
management construct (γLOW: 0.45; p<0.01; Table 4; Figure 2) is less important 
than the assessed importance of aggressive accounting practices (γLOW: 0.60; 
p<0.01); the interaction effect also remains negative (γLOW: -0.21; p<0.01).  This 
model remains similarly significant, as in Figure 1.  As the results are different from 
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 the overall model, inference would indicate that – for higher risk clients – auditors 
place a lot more weight on the ethical conduct of managers than on aggressive 
accounting practices.  This result is confirmed by the SEM model, run on the 565 
higher-risk sub-sample (summarized in Table 4), although this model is marginally 
significant (AGFI: 0.95; RMR: 0.01; TLI: 0.79; NFI: 0.88 – not all acceptable 
levels; construct reliability were above 0.6).26 
FIGURE 2: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL FOR THE LOWER 
RISK SUB-SAMPLE (N: 5,038)   
 
                                                 
26 Note that results of the General Linear Model for the higher-risk sub-sample were consistent with 
those of the full sample. 
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 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
This study documents that managerial attitudes significantly affect auditor 
fraud-risk perspectives, accounting for 82% of the variability observed by auditors 
in assessing senior management inclinations for intentional misstatements in 
financial reporting (supporting Deshmukh and Talluru 1998).  Managerial attitudes 
are represented in this study by managerial ethical misconduct indications, 
aggressiveness in accounting practices, and the auditor-management relationship 
quality.  It would appear reasonable to infer that if auditors were to focus their 
fraud-risk procedures (in applying SAS 99 or ISA 240), they could mitigate 82% of 
their risk by seeking out indications of senior management misconduct and focusing 
on significant areas of accounting most prone to fraud (revenue recognition and 
accounting estimates).  The former could be achieved through examination of 
misconduct allegations stemming from whistleblower lines, internal audit reports, 
or the press, and by reflecting on the sources of tension in the auditor-management 
relationship.  The latter can be achieved by identifying the areas of accounting most 
susceptible to management manipulation.  Information over management behaviour 
and attitudes which shape an organization’s financial reporting culture have been 
studied in this paper using auditor observations, perceptions, and tangible evidence 
of heightened risk (recall) across a sample of 5,603 audit acceptance and 
continuance forms used by a Big Four accounting firm in the Netherlands.   
 
The results indicate that the ethical conduct of senior managers is perceived 
as the single most important element associated with higher fraud risk assessment.  
Aggressive accounting practices, captured through assessments of revenue 
recognition and accounting estimates, are also perceived to significantly contribute 
to higher levels of fraud risk.  The quality of the auditor-management relationship, 
measuring dimensions of trust and honesty, is found to be an important factor 
affecting the overall risk of fraud, but this element is only pronounced at lower, 
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 fraud risk levels (not significant at higher fraud risk levels).  A similar finding 
applies to the level of senior management experience and skill in the firms which 
were evaluated.  These results are generally consistent with the suggestions from 
practitioner guidance (SAS 99; ISA 240), audit literature (Loebbecke et al. 1989; 
Bell and Carcello 2000), and corporate illegality studies (Baucus 1994), although 
the differences across fraud risk levels (and compounding, non-linear effects 
thereof) found in this study are unique. 
 
This study has confirmed the importance of indications of mistrust, known 
to influence the risk of fraud (SAS 99; ISA 240; Loebbecke et al. 1989), through 
hypothesis 1A (βj > 0; Table 4).  The study found no evidence to support the equal 
importance of indications of mistrust and managerial attitudes associated with fraud 
risk (H1B: βj ≠ βj+1, was supported), thereby further supporting and extending the 
work of Bell and Carcello (2000).  In testing hypotheses 2A and 2B, there is 
support for H2A (γj > 0; Table 4) and for H2B, this study finds that ethical 
boundaries are perceived as more important than accounting boundaries in shaping 
the financial reporting culture within organizations to prevent fraud.  In simple 
terms, fraud is perceived by auditors more as an ethical rather than an accounting 
breakdown.  As of 2006, there are 37 different international standards, 9 
interpretations, and many more publications defining the accounting principles that 
apply and providing guidance on how to apply them.  Not one of these standards 
define the managerial attitudes (including ethical standards and principles) that 
should be embraced by organizations, nor guidance on how to specifically address 
breakdowns in trust.27 Instead, the focus has been placed on general codes to be 
followed by accountants and auditors alone.   
 
                                                 
27 Audit standards generally call for increased professional scepticism, communication with those 
charged with governance, and auditor resignation as the main alternatives available to the auditor. 
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 This study has analyzed auditor risk assessments in the Netherlands across a 
broad spectrum of audit clients who differ in industry, size, jurisdictional 
requirements (included US multi-national subsidiaries), and ownership structure.  
Due to data confidentiality and data limitations, such differences could not be fully 
reported, although the presence of certain regulated industries and institutional 
variables did not significantly affect the results.  In addition, this study has 
extrapolated auditor views and perceptions of risk, as a proxy for control elements 
observed within organizations.28  Thus, the results cannot be readily generalized to 
instances of fraud in various countries.  Although, the general findings are that 
ethical conduct and aggressive accounting perceptions and observations are 
important for auditor fraud risk assessments, it is questionable whether an 
organizational focus on these elements will reduce instances of fraud.  In addition, 
the non-linear weighing of risk factors cannot be necessarily attributable to auditor 
thinking, as the instrument’s framed statements tap into various dimensions of 
auditor experiences, perceptions, observations, suspicious, and recall of past 
incidents.  Lastly, the data used for this study relates to companies in one country 
only and may not necessarily be valid in other institutional settings.   
 
One potential avenue for future research is to understand the non-linear 
weighting of trust indicators, within a fraud context to further explain the negative 
interaction effects across SEM models.  Much more research needs to be performed 
to examine the different aspects of ethics, especially those involving how 
organizations and other stakeholders should address moral reasoning levels, locus 
of control, moral philosophy, and the influence of the external work environment.  
For aggressive accounting factors, a critical review of how judgments are formed 
and how companies apply accounting conventions is necessary.  There currently is 
little research on how to deal with systematic or structured transactions on the edge 
                                                 
28 Note that auditors were found to be more conservative in their acceptance between 2003 and 2004.  
The justification is that this is the period after all the scandals in the United States and the Ahold 
accounting scandal in the Netherlands hit in 2003. 
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 of accounting rules.  Rather than wait for regulators to impose their views, directors 
and managers should proactively set a strategy addressing what they consider 
proper and improper behaviour, to avoid heading towards a slippery slope of 
inconsistencies, relativism, and, potentially, fraud.  Little is know about how to 
shape ethical judgments and ethical concerns in a financial reporting context.  This 
study is a first step towards understanding a different institutional setting than the 
United States on a topic which is difficult to research. 
 
In order for modellers to conduct practical analyses and to make strategy 
recommendations, they need access to data that are often hard to collect.  
Information is often considered to be proprietary and withheld for select usage.  
Access to a large data base, at a Big Four accounting firm, provided the ideal 
situation for building a mathematical model on which to base predictions and gain 
insight into auditor thinking.  The results of the investigation allowed for 
recommendations that will permit policy makers to correctly identify and 
emphasize those factors most critical in preventing fraud.  Even though many 
auditors could have identified these risk factors, the mathematical model clarifies 
and adds precision.  It allows for better decision making, opens up further 
questions, and confirms what was only believed or thought to be true, without the 
benefit of scientific confirmation.  The research should help to establish a structure 
for dialogue between the academic community and practice, both of which will 
benefit.29   
   
                                                 
29 In an ideal world, policy would be based on data and models, where possible.  Mathematics is a 
science based on accuracy, and herein lies a danger.  Modellers need to understand the limitations of 
their work, but the investigator also needs to have access to large amounts of data in order to make 
predictions that are as precise as possible.  Policy based on data is on a surer footing than policy that 
relies on belief or intuition or isolated observations made by individuals.  It has been the purpose of 
this investigation to provide the accuracy which will confirm what was already known by auditors 
from their day-to-day work.  This study provides empirical support to principles developed in the 
U.S. for Management Anti-Fraud Program and Controls (AICPA 2001) in a European setting. 
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 It is known that most managers operate at lower levels of reasoning in 
business contexts than in non-business contexts, and that managers typically reason 
at the “conventional level” (Weber 1990).  Therefore, organizations need to address 
the factors most important at this level.  Moral reasoners at this level will intend to 
act to make the company look better in the eyes of investors and creditors (Uddin 
and Gillette 2002) and these managers will tend to support fixed rules and authority 
levels.  Therefore, to prevent all forms of illegal and unethical actions, 
organizations need to codify their principles and values in rules (policies, 
procedures, and controls) and discourage all misconduct.   
 
The inference drawn, from the empirical analysis of auditor perceptions and 
experiences, is that managerial attitudes are important in building trust in an 
organization’s financial reporting culture, which may be shaped through: (a) a “zero 
tolerance” organizational policy towards senior management misconduct, 
dishonesty, and aggressive accounting, overseen by a competent, well-informed and 
powerful Audit Committee; (b) well-functioning and structured Corporate functions 
overseeing and supporting accounting, legal, and ethical, compliance matters in a 
comprehensive and cohesive manner, under direct oversight senior management 
and non-executive directors; and (c) active oversight, monitoring, and open 
dialogue between the Audit Committee and the external and internal auditors, as 
well as other Compliance functions.  This paper is intended to form a bridge 
between theory and practice, especially in highlighting the importance of “soft” 
areas involving managerial attitudes to auditor-assessed risk of fraud. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definition 
 
# MODEL VARIABLE FRAMING OF INSTRUMENT 
Y MgtInclin2IntentMisstate Management inclination to intentionally 
misstate financial reporting: 
• Lowest Risk: Management attaches great 
importance to achieve fair and accurate 
financial statement presentation. 
• Low Risk: Management makes a reasonable 
effort to achieve fair and accurate statement 
presentation. 
• Some Risk: Management is not particularly 
interested in financial statement presentation but 
there has been no evidence of intentional 
misstatement. 
• High Risk: Management sometimes shows a 
disregard for fair and accurate financial 
statement presentation. 
• Highest Risk: Management has in the past 
attempted to distort or hide information relevant 
to the entity’s financial condition or operating 
results. 
 
X1 IntegrityAndEthics Integrity and Ethics: 
• Lowest Risk: Management has an excellent 
reputation for integrity and ethics. High ethical 
standards are evident –for example, a code of 
conduct exists and fully communicated and is 
enforced throughout the organization. 
• Low Risk: Management has a good reputation 
for integrity and ethics. 
• Some Risk: There is no reason to question 
management’s integrity and ethics. 
• High Risk: Management’s commitment to 
integrity and ethics is in some doubt. 
• Highest Risk: There are indications based on 
employee allegations, regulatory inquiries, 
adverse publicity, or other sources that 
management has engaged in unethical activity. 
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 # MODEL VARIABLE FRAMING OF INSTRUMENT 
X2 MgtExperienceDepth Management’s Experience and Skill: 
• Lowest Risk: The management team is very 
experienced and has excellent functional skills 
in all key positions. 
• Low Risk: Good management team has good 
experience and is skilled in all key functions. 
• Some Risk: The management team has average 
experience and functional skills. 
• High Risk: The management skill lacks 
experience or functional skills in a key area. 
• Highest Risk: The management team lacks 
experience and functional skills in more than 
one key area. 
X3 AcctgEstimateReliability Reliability of accounting estimates: 
• Lowest Risk: Consistent History of accurate 
estimates 
• Low Risk: Accounting estimates have usually 
been reasonable. 
• Some Risk: Accounting estimates have been 
conservative. 
• High Risk: Accounting estimates have usually 
been optimistic. 
• Highest Risk: Accounting estimates have often 
been unreasonable. 
X4 RevenueRecognition Revenue Recognition: 
• Lowest Risk: Revenue transactions have 
relatively standard terms and conditions and 
revenue recognition policies are applied 
consistently.  The entity has few, if any, post-
sale contingent obligations. 
• Low Risk: Significant non-standard revenue 
transactions occur occasionally but the entity is 
proactive in discussing with the auditors the 
transactions and their revenue recognition 
attributes. 
• Some Risk: Significant non-standard revenue 
transactions occur occasionally.  The entity is 
not always proactive in discussing with the 
auditors the transactions and their revenue 
recognition attributes. 
• High Risk: Significant non-standard revenue 
transactions occur regularly.  The entity is not 
proactive in discussing with the auditors the 
transactions and their revenue recognition 
attributes. 
• Highest Risk: Significant transactions are 
structured to achieve revenue recognition 
objectives that would otherwise not be 
achieved. 
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 # MODEL VARIABLE FRAMING OF INSTRUMENT 
X5 AuditRelationship Audit Relationship: 
• Lowest Risk: Management regularly initiates 
discussion with us on accounting issues.  We 
have effective and candid communication with 
the board and, where applicable, the audit 
committee.  Management does not question our 
audit scope.  We have free access to people and 
information. 
• Low Risk:  Management initiates discussion 
with us on accounting issues as they arise.  Our 
communications with the board and audit 
committee are structured and substantive. 
Management occasionally questions our audit 
scope; Management sometimes requires 
discussion before allowing access to people and 
information; Management accepts audit 
findings. 
• Some Risk: Management is open to our advice 
on accounting issues but does not initiate 
discussion. Our communication with the board 
and audit committee is somewhat limited in 
time and format; There have been some 
attempts by management to limit our audit 
scope; Access to people and information is 
closely monitored.  Management accepts audit 
findings but tries to downplay their importance. 
• High Risk: Management sometimes disputes 
our advice on accounting issues and does not 
initiated discussion.  We have very limited 
opportunity for substantive communication to 
the board and audit committee; Management 
attempts to reduce our audit scope; Access to 
people and information is granted but only after 
challenge and delay; Management often 
challenges audit findings and does not initiated 
discussion on accounting issues.  Management 
typically disputes and it is very difficult to reach 
agreement with them. 
• Highest Risk: Management does not initiate 
discussion on accounting issues and when the 
issues arise, is less than forthright in describing 
the relevant facts patterns; we have no 
opportunity to substantive communication with 
the board and audit committee; There are 
sometimes attempts by management to dictate 
audit scope or intimidate us.  There are formal 
or informal restrictions on access to people or 
information; Management typically disputes 
audit findings and disclosures and it is very 
difficult to reach agreement with them. 
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FIGURE 3: DIMENSIONS CAPTURED BY AUDITOR RISK 
ASSESSMENTS  
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